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ABSTRACT
The Tor network is a low-latency overlay network for TCP flows that is designed to provide privacy
and anonymity to its users. It is currently in use by many as a means to avoid censorship of both
information to be shared and information to be retrieved. This paper details the architecture of the Tor
network as a platform for evaluating the current state of forensic analysis of the Tor network. Specific
attempts to block access to the Tor network are examined to identify (a) the processes utilized to
identify Tor nodes, and (b) the resulting exposure of potentially inculpatory evidence. Additional
known, but yet to be perpetrated, attacks are examined for a more holistic view of the state of forensics
of the Tor network. Based on the combination of these studies, there is some evidence that a specific,
individual flow of traffic over the Tor network is attributable to a single entity. However, the content
of that flow has not been compromised within the Tor network. As such, the inculpatory evidence
required for legal action is limited at this time.
Keywords: Tor, Forensic Analysis, Privacy & Anonymity

1. INTRODUCTION
Tor is a popular 2nd generation implementation of the onion routing topology (Tor, 2012). This
topology was developed in work for the U.S. Navy Research Lab in the mid-1990s (Goldschlage,
Reed, Syverson, 1996). This is an overlay network of the public Internet that is designed to provide
online privacy and anonymity to its users through two different mechanisms. The first mechanism of
privacy relies on multiple encryption iterations in order to obfuscate the entirety of traditional IP
packets. The second mechanism relies on seemingly random network ingress points, routing hops, and
egress points to diminish an external observer’s ability to identify the end-to-end path of a traffic flow
through traffic analysis or network surveillance.
Since Tor is designed to provide anonymity, it would be beneficial to have at least a rudimentary
definition of anonymity. One could simply say it is the state of being anonymous. But that seems
circular in definition and is less than useful for any rigorous discussion. So, instead, anonymity could
better be thought of as “the state of not being identifiable within a set of subjects” (Pfitzmann &
Kohotopp, 2001, p.1). Even using this definition, there are still murky waters concerning attribution of
the Tor flows to a particular entity.
The anonymity provided by this network is intended to allow users to send and receive data across the
network with little fear of being identified by an external observer, regardless of friend or foe status.
Since this tool can be utilized by both the innocuous and nefarious with no immediate mechanism to
distinguish between them, and the anonymity and privacy provided may afford the impetus for illicit
online behavior, many governments and law enforcement agencies have become increasingly
concerned with the operations of this network. Additionally, many nations wish to censor
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communications both within and across their borders, including: Belarus, China, Cuba, North Korea,
Syria, and more (Ho, 2009). In fact, recently, all encrypted traffic was blocked within Palestine
(Ma’an News, 2012; York, 2012), all HTTPS traffic was blocked in Iran (Rezale, 2012), and access to
Tor Directories and Bridges have been blocked by State-sponsored service providers (Tor Project,
2009; Tor Project, 2010, etc.). For many citizens within these countries, access to Tor was a potential
solution to this censorship, if they were able to access the network. As such, shortly after these denials
of entrance to the Tor network, access to the nodes was restored by the semi-anonymous operators of
the Tor network, much to the dismay of the State.
Discussions of Tor Hidden Service nodes and client-side views of Tor are left for future work. This
paper focuses on the network-side attributes of Tor as well as the inculpatory and exculpatory
evidence from the data communications and networking aspects of its operations. This view uses
cybersecurity as the lens to focus this view. As such, this view is driven by the understanding that
cybersecurity and digital forensic analysis are inextricably linked. These two are complementary,
supplementary, and co-dependent. An analysis of the security processes gives way to the mechanisms
that are useful for performing forensic analysis.
This paper identifies types of uses and users of the Tor network which includes highlighting the
history and operations of the Tor network while differentiating its operation from that of the traditional
routing mechanisms in use on the public Internet. It then identifies known and executed “attacks”
against the Tor network and provides details of their execution process(es). Utilizing previous Statesponsored efforts, earlier successful forensic approaches are identified for the purpose of determining
if unique individual flows were identified, or merely particular nodes and their aggregate traffics were
determined to be participatory. It will be shown in this paper that even though it might be possible to
identify a particular flow of traffic, attribution to any individual is not provable through Tor network
attributes. Yet, that correlation of traffic flow to a particular host device may be inculpatory enough
for some jurisdictions. Next, known potential attacks against the Tor network are detailed. It should
be noted that while these are known potential attacks, there is not yet any proof that they have been.
These are intended to provide a foundation to identify potential forensic analysis of operations of the
Tor network. Lastly, we detail the potential evidentiary findings of a generic Tor node and any
applicable inculpatory indicators therein.

2. THE TOR ARCHITECTURE
nd

Tor is a 2 generation implementation of the onion routing topology initially developed in work for
the U.S. Navy Research Lab in the mid-1990s (Goldschlage, Reed, Syverson, 1996; Tor, 2012). This
implementation of the onion routing topology is intended to be a low-latency overlay network for TCP
flows over the public Internet that intends to provide privacy and anonymity to its users. Specifically,
Tor provides the functionality that “prevents a user from being linked with their communication
partners” (Loesing, Murdoch, Dingledine, 204, 2010).
While the original design goal of the Tor network was to provide significantly more privacy to a user
than provided in default Internet communications, Tor has recently been used by evade statesponsored censorship attempts (Loesing, Murdoch, Dingledine, 2010). Dingledine has noted that there
is an “ongoing trend in law, policy, and technology” that “threaten anonymity… (and) undermine our
ability to speak and read freely” on the public Internet (n.d.). For example, in early 2012, Iran
disallowed access to any sites that utilized HTTPS (Kabir News, 2012). Also, in May, 2012, the
Palestinian government shut down eight news websites for posting critical opinion pieces of the
president (Hale; OONI, 2012). In mid-2012, the Ethiopian Telecommunications Corporation began
performing deep packet inspection on all ingress and egress traffic coming in to the country. As
Ethiopia’s only service provider, they had direct access to all such traffic (Runa, 2012). York has
provided multiple cases where there have been calls for additional censorship, the creation of a
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censorship body, and even examples where citizens have been arrested for political or religious
reasons (2012b). And so then, Tor is intended to provide not only privacy in these types of scenarios,
but anonymity by providing protection against eavesdropping and man-in-the-middle attacks.
Additionally, by using multiple iterations of encryption and intermediating nodes defining a radically
different path from a client to its ultimate destination, deep packet inspection, traffic analysis, and
timing analysis attempts are mitigated.

2.1 Traditional Internetwork Routing
In a traditional routing environment, each packet from a source is addressed with the ultimate address
of the destination. A router will then examine the destination address, choose the best neighboring
router based on the longest-match algorithm, and then forward the packet to that destination. Each
router along the path from source to destination performs this action on every packet in a flow. This
process, while resilient to the dynamic topology of the Internet, is inherently insecure. This process
potentially leaks information about both the source and destination of the flow, the content of the
packets, as well as the path that is used to deliver these packet flows. As such, there is little inherent
privacy, and no anonymity in the default routing process.
A pair of options that were defined in the original IP standard for use in networks was loose source
and record routing. These options allowed the source node of an IP packet to explicitly specify a
partial, or complete, path for the packet to follow (RFC 791, 1981). Source-routing overrides the
traditional routing process using the longest-match algorithm to search the routing table that occurs on
each router in a path. Instead, the packet is routed along the destinations listed in the source-route
contained in the IP packet header. This approach to routing a packet through the network relies on the
assumption that the source of the IP packet has a complete view of the network topology to the
ultimate destination and can provide explicit path information in the packet. By specifying each hop
from the source to destination, or minimally at least one intervening hop, a “trusted” path can be used
to deliver packets. Yet, even though the path may be “trusted”, this IP options approach provides no
additional security of the packet; neither is there additional privacy, confidentiality, or integrity of the
packet using this approach. Further, the source and destination node addresses are still directly
readable by any passive monitor in this path. Extending this concept, the use of this IP option could
potentially be used to reduce privacy by exposing known “trusted” nodes in the path to additional
scrutiny by any interested party. Because of this, most routers on the public Internet ignore the path
specified by a host with this option or discard the packet altogether (Zwicky, Cooper, and Chapman,
2000).
Enhancements and additions have been made to attempt to add privacy to this original routing process.
Encryption, in the form of SSL and TLS, has been added to secure the payload of each packet from
inspection (intrusion) by outside parties. However, this approach does nothing to obfuscate the source
or destination of the flow. Also, simply encrypting the payload still allows traffic analysis and timing
analysis to occur and potentially identify the type of payload being transacted even though the exact
payload is not identified. Other encryption approaches have been added to this process to further
obfuscate the packet payload through the use of IPsec, which encrypts the IP packet payload. This
approach hides the TCP or UDP port numbers, which makes protocol identification more difficult, but
not impossible. Traffic analysis and timing analysis are still possible, as well as the immediate
identification of the source and destination IP address information for the source and destination
nodes. This is perhaps better recognized as providing integrity and confidentiality of the payload, not
privacy or anonymity.
An additional implementation of IPsec allows for full encapsulation and encryption of the entire
packet. This is referred to as Tunnel-Mode. In this implementation of IPsec, the packet is fully
encrypted and then encapsulated within another packet. This new packet typically will have different
source and destination IP addresses than that of the encapsulated packet. These new IP addresses are

107

ADFSL Conference on Digital Forensics, Security and Law, 2013
the end points of a VPN tunnel. Each router along the path from the new source address to the new
destination address passes the encapsulated packet with no knowledge of the original source and
destination IP address. This approach provides some privacy for the packet flow, as an external
observer will have difficulty identifying the payload information. However, the VPN end points are
still fully capable of examining the payload and identifying the communicating participants.

2.2 Routing in the Tor Network
The Tor network is based on the original onion routing architecture described in Hiding Routing
Information by Goldschlag, Reed, and Syverson (1996). The Tor network, while being based on the
original onion routing architecture, has deviated from and enhanced significantly in operation. There
are three defined connection-establishment processes for Tor (Dingledine, Mathewson, n.d.). This
paper focuses on the most recent of those processes (v3).
A rudimentary understanding of the architectural components is critical to the discussion of the Tor
network. So, a short description of the major components of the Tor network is included here:


Bridge (Bridge Relay) – A Tor Relay that does not report to the Tor Directories and can
only be reached through knowledge of their location on existing networks. These nodes
are used to circumvent filtering techniques against known Relays.



Circuit – The onion router path from a Host through a public internetwork to a subset of
Relays that requires a unique set of encryption between the host and each Relay in the
path. Routing of packets between the Host and each ordered Relay is handled with the
traditional packet forwarding mechanism by the routers within the public internetwork.



Directory – One of a set of Tor nodes that collect, verify, format, and disseminate Relay
status information throughout the Tor network.



Host – The source node in the Tor network that runs the Tor software proxy, initiates
circuit construction, and passes data through a local SOCKS proxy into circuits for
traversal over the encrypted paths.



Mix – The combination of Relays provided by a Directory that a Host will use to establish
a Circuit.



Relay – A node in the Tor network that acts as a circuit routing device. This node
responds to circuit construction requests by establishing an encrypted channel between
itself and host. These node forwards packets based on the Circuit ID contained in the Tor
packet header. Availability and capacity of this node are reported to the Tor Directories.

In order for the Tor network to be able to process any connections, each of the Relays must report their
availability to a set of Directories. This is shown in Figure 1 below. Each of the Relays reports their
name, exit policy, available capacity, and other defined information to the Directories, which then
verify the reported capacity and utilize a voting process to establish a network consensus document for
distribution to Hosts (Tor Directory Protocol, version 3, 2012).
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Tor Directory

Relay B
Destination
Host

Initiating Host
With Tor Proxy
Relay A

Relay C

Figure 1 Relay Registration
Hosts must learn of the available Relays by periodically contacting a hard-coded Directory from a set
of Directories, as shown in Figure 2. This connection is actually established over a single-hop onion
route to obfuscate the source Host from the Directory. The Directory will respond with a consensus
document to the requesting Host, which will then determine the mix of Relays to be used to establish
the onion route.

Tor Directory

Relay B
Destination
Host

Initiating Host
With Tor Proxy
Relay A

Relay C

Figure 2 Mix Request & Response
Based on the mix derived by the Host from the previous steps, the Host will iteratively build an onion
route a single Relay at a time, choosing the exit Relay first. This Relay is selected based on it having
an acceptable exit policy and then the remaining Relays are pseudorandomly chosen (Dingledine &
Matthewson, 2012). The host will initiate the first layer in the onion route to the initial Relay using
the Diffie-Hellman Ephemeral Key Exchange to establish a TLS connection based on those derived
keys,
as
seen
in
Figure
3,
using
preferred
ciphersuites
such
as
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, TLS_DHE-RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, and
SSL_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA (Dingledine & Matthewson, 2012). Then, the Host
sends a Tor specific command (CREATE) to indicate a new circuit is needed. The Relay (Relay A)
will respond with a CREATED command if successful. The first layer of the onion route has then
been created and is uniquely identified by a CircuitID that is meaningful only between the Host and
Relay. Traditional routing processes will still occur to determine the path between the Host and the
first Relay, and vice versa, in the onion route.
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Relay B
Destination
Host

Initiating Host
With Tor Proxy
Key
Sequence

Relay A

Relay C

Figure 3 Building Channel to Relay A
The Host will then extend the circuit established in the previous step by negotiating the second layer
of the onion route with the second Relay (Relay B). Again, the Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange is used
to establish shared keys for the TLS connection, as seen in Figure 4. The Host sends an EXTEND
command to Relay A, encrypted using the shared keys of Host-Relay A, which then forwards the
content to Relay B. That content is a CREATE command for Relay B and is encrypted with the HostRelay B keys. This then establishes the second layer of the onion route circuit. So, the host now
manages two shared keys, one for each of the Relays that it has established connections with to build a
circuit. The first layer of the circuit (Relay A) is unable to observe the content of the cells that flow
over it from the Host to Relay B.

Relay B
Destination
Host

Initiating Host
With Tor Proxy
Key
Sequence

Relay A

Relay C

Figure 4 Extending Channel to Relay B
The onion route has one additional layer added to it through the use of a third Relay (Relay C). The
same process is used to extend the circuit as in the previous steps, with an additional round of
encryption occurring for the newly established connection between the Host and Relay C that traverses
both Relay A and Relay B, as shown in Figure 5. Relay A and Relay B both process an EXTEND
command, while Relay C processes a CREATE command. At this point, the onion route is complete.
A Host now has an anonymized connection through the public Internet.

110

ADFSL Conference on Digital Forensics, Security and Law, 2013

Relay B
Destination
Host

Initiating Host
With Tor Proxy
Key
Sequence

Relay A

Relay C

Figure 5 Extending Channel to Relay C
Using this established onion route, the Host can interact with any public resource as seen in Figure 6
by using the RELAY commands within the cell to be routed. Relay C will perform all DNS queries on
behalf of the Host so as to limit any monitoring of the Host in an attempt to identify specific
destinations or resources that are being accessed. In this way, each node in the path (initiating client,
Relays, and destination device) only knows the identity of its immediately adjacent neighbors
(Dingledine et al, 2004). It should be note, however, that simply using the onion route doesn’t provide
any protection of the data flowing between Relay C and the destination. In fact, monitoring traffic at
an exit node is one of the viable methods for attempting to identify users of the Tor network. So, any
unencrypted traffic between the exit node (Relay C) and the destination can be observed, recorded,
and examined for specific content.

Relay B
Destination
Host

Initiating Host
With Tor Proxy
Relay A

Relay C

Figure 6 Anonymous Communication via Tor
A Host does not use, or maintain only a single onion route. In fact, it regularly constructs and
terminates circuits in a timely manner. That is, a Tor Host may initiate a new circuit a frequently as
once per minute, and will terminate an unused circuit every five minutes. Most circuits are terminated
after less than ten minutes of use as a mechanism to reduce traffic analysis attacks against the network
and those using the network. A simple example of the diversity of connections maintained by a Host
can be seen in Figure 7.
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Relay X

Relay Y

Relay Z

Relay B
Destination
Host

Initiating Host
With Tor Proxy
Relay A

Relay C

Figure 7 Multiple Distinct Concurrent Channels from Host
So then, this approach to obfuscating data provides anonymity of the source, as only the Directory and
first Relay know the identity of the initiating client and not the identity of the destination. The
remaining Relays will not know the identity of the initiating client. Only the exit Relay (Relay C) will
know the identity of the destination.

3. CURRENT TOR NETWORK ATTACKS
There are many well-known mechanisms that can be used to censor materials on the Internet. These
have ranged from simple source/destination IP address filtering, DNS filtering/injection/hijacking, as
well as content filtering (Ho, 2009). However, these approaches assume a user with little expectation
of privacy or anonymity. If a user utilizes encryption or other obfuscation approaches, then these
censoring tasks become more difficult. This is the intent of those utilizing the Tor network for access
to resources on the Internet – make difficult the analysis of their traffic content and its characteristics
through encryption and anonymizing services. So then, for authorities to keep pace with the censorship
of content flowing over the Tor network, they must also attempt to censor the utilization of this
network.
Previously, performing deep packet inspection by a state-owned service provider would provide
complete access to the traffic being sent or received by any user. At any ingress/egress point of the
network, analysis could take place through a legal (or illegal) wiretap or other intercept process. The
network could even be designed to have several “chokepoints” where this analysis could be expedited.
Even if non-typical protocols were implemented by privacy- and anonymity-seeking users, digital
fingerprinting and traffic analysis would typically be sufficient to identify potentially “dangerous”
network traffic. However, the Tor network significantly, and sometimes dramatically, complicates this
process for state-sponsored filtering.
As nation-states attempt to quell access to the Tor network, opposing actions have been taken to
restore anonymous capabilities. The following is a partial listing that highlights a subset of current
“attacks” against Tor (the service), the Tor network components, and the corresponding responses by
Tor maintainers to circumvent these censorship attempts.
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In September, 2011, Iran blocked access to the Tor network by adding a filtering rule to their national
border routers. This rule specifically identified Tor traffic and filtered this traffic while still passing all
other traffic that was not previously blocked. This filter identified a specific component of the traffic
flow that established the Tor connections. Tor is designed to make all network traffic appear that of a
client accessing an HTTPS web server. As such, this requires a secure handshake process. It was this
handshake process that was uniquely identified by the Iranian government. The SSL session certificate
expiration time on Tor Relays was set to two hours, which is uncharacteristic of certificates issued
from a real, public certificate authority. The resolution, which was implemented the same day by Tor
engineers, was to lengthen the expiration time of the Relay certificates to more closely emulate that of
a true SSL certificate implementation (Tor, 2012).
The standard connection initiation process involves a client requesting a listing of Relays from a
Directory. These Directories are statically coded in the Tor client, meaning they are directly known by
any party using, or monitoring, Tor. Because of this, the Chinese government simply blocked access to
the IP addresses of each of those known Directories, effectively eliminating a client’s ability to
establish a connection into the Tor network (Lewman, 2009). Prior to this event in 2009, the Tor
developers added functionality to the Tor architecture to resolve the potential of this vulnerability
being exploited. The resolution to this vulnerability was the addition of Bridges into the Tor
architecture. A Bridge functions just like a Tor Relay, but is not registered in the public Directory
servers and is used as the first (entry) or last (exit) Relay in the path So then, a Tor client must learn of
these Bridge locations (addresses) by some other means. This is accomplished by using the graphical
interface to Tor, Vidalia, or by manually configuring the Bridge IP addresses into the Tor client after
retrieving the information from the Tor website. Considering that both of these approaches are likely
filtered by any entity blocking access to Directories and Relays, an email option is also available. (Tor
Projects, 2012). This architectural adaptation effectively circumvented the blocking of Directories and
Relays.
In late-2011, the Chinese government began blocking access to Bridges within China. Analysis of the
blocking actions revealed that connections were initially allowed, but were terminated within a matter
of minutes (Wilde, 2012). Further analysis showed that filtering process was performing a passive
fingerprint analysis of the communications between a host and the Bridge and then attempted to
establish an active connection to the Bridge. It was determined that an identifiable client-side
parameter of the SSL negotiation was unique to the communications of hosts to Tor Bridges. The
intensity of the active scans suggested near line rate deep packet inspection, which requires significant
processing capabilities (Wilde, 2012). This type of scanning lasted for only a few short weeks before
it was abruptly terminated (Wilde, 2012). But, was apparently active again in March, 2012 when
additional evaluation was performed (Winter and Lindskog, 2012). This attack is further mitigated in
the most current handshake negotiation process, as TLS has supplanted SSL, and the parameter in the
SSL/TLS cipher list that was uniquely identifiable has thus been removed (Wilde, 2012).
Not long after the Chinese government identified the client-side cipher list issue to block access to
Bridges, the Kazakh government also began blocking access to Bridges within Kazakhstan (Lewman,
2012). Again, unpublished Bridges were being identified through continual deep packet inspection.
Until this time, Relays were not blocked within the country and Tor was used somewhat extensively.
Analysis of traffic arriving at the Bridges suggested no active scans, as the Chinese government had
undertaken. However, it was determined that the passive scans of deep packet inspection have
identified a unique parameter of the server-side hello message in the TLS negotiation. An additional
tool, called obfsproxy, while not directly part of the Tor architecture, continued to function within the
country during this time (Lewman, 2012). Thus, allowing citizens anonymized access to the Internet.
As of this writing, no resolution to this filtering approach was found.
In the Bad Apple Attack an insecure application, such as a web browser, used over Tor is capable of
revealing the Host’s IP address thorough information leaking via Flash, Java, JavaScript, etc. In this
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case, they exploited a BitTorrent application. By leaking this information, there is the potential to be
able to attribute particular quantities and patterns of packets to the source as member packets of this
flow. By leaking this information, all other flows from that host could be considered suspect (Le
Blond et. al., 2011).
Many more attacks against Tor can be found by browsing the Tor blogs and brief Internet searches.
With the recent political unrest in Egypt, Syria, Libya, and more, there are moribund examples of
State-sponsored censorship attempts. Interestingly, censorship is not necessarily only occurring
locations of political upheaval. Access to the Tor website is blocked by non-government controlled
cellular providers in both the UK and US (Tor, 2012).

4. PROPOSED TOR NETWORK ATTACKS
In addition to the many existing and perpetrated attacks that have already transpired against the Tor
network, there are multiple theoretical attacks that have been described by the Tor developers. This
section briefly describes some of those attacks as a means to discover Bridges and Relays and
subsequently use them an attack launching point to (a) discover the topology of the Tor network; (b)
break anonymity of the Tor user (profiling, timing, or traffic analysis); or (c) block access to the Tor
network (Tor, 2011a; Tor, 2011b).
Many of these described attacks by the Tor developers and maintainers center on a nefarious party
passively monitoring connections through an observation point within the Tor path. A more active
version of this is to have the attacker actually participate in the Tor network as a Bridge, Relay, Guard,
or even client. Both of these approaches allow the timing and traffic analysis attacks to be performed
against a Tor user in such a manner that most Tor users would not recognize any analysis was
occurring. Other approaches are more active in their style; including port scans, issuing malformed
connection requests, and spoofing messages between Tor nodes. Combinations of these attacks may be
performed to be more discriminating in actions against network users. That is, they may be
concentrated in a more targeted manner to reduce collateral damage within the network.
Additional attacks have been proposed by Feamster and Dingledine (2004); Murdoch and Danezis
(2005); and Dingledine and Murdoch (2009). Each of the scenarios described in these papers seek to
perform traffic analysis and timing attacks. That is, attribution of a flow of traffic to a particular
location within the network at a specific moment in time. The content of these flows were not
exposed in these scenarios.
Other attacks over the Tor network have been performed that have specifically identified the actual
source’s IP address, hostname, time zone settings, and Internet browser type and version by exposing
weaknesses in the applications that use Tor (Christensen, 2006a; Christensen, 2006b). Alternatively,
an additional side-channel attack has been proposed by Shebaro (2012) in which a unique, identifiable,
binary string is written to a client from a controlled or compromised destination; leaving the client
potentially identifiable–eliminating privacy and anonymity upon investigation. That is, users have
expected Tor to provide privacy and anonymity of their web browsing, yet their browsing habits
allowed their anonymity to be compromised.

5. EVIDENTIARY ANALYSIS
Tor is not a panacea for all network related censorship issues. Tor can’t solve complete network
blackouts or shutdowns, as in Syria in late 2012 (Renesys, 2012). There must be connectivity in place
for Tor to utilize. Without a network path, Tor is as powerless as any other connection tool;
anonymizing or otherwise. With that being said, this section will analyze the potential for identifying
inculpatory evidence within the Tor network for the purpose of some action being taken by law
enforcement agencies (LEA).
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Each of the perpetrated and proposed attacks has little forensic value at first pass. The value of these
attacks, when successful, is in the transparent monitoring capabilities that a State or LEA may have
that would subsequently allow direct correlation of inculpatory evidence to a specific network host.
This approach from a state-sponsored attack is highly reliant on their ability to track or trace a
particular data flow. This ability to correlate a flow to a particular host is dependent on the ability to
actually capture those flows. This is directly related to the number of egress (and by extension,
ingress) points to those networks. An analysis of the number of connection points into and out of a
nation has been performed by Renesys in order to determine the likelihood of a complete blackout
occurring similar to the Syria 2012 incident (Forbes, 2012). An alternate view of this data could be
taken that a state may not wish to fully disconnect their citizens from the Internet. Instead, these
connection points can become the capture, and correlation points for their monitoring systems;
thereby, providing a State an evidence-gathering facility directly in the network path.

5.1 Analysis
To date, there are no known attempts to break the encryption algorithms used specifically attributable
to the Tor network. That is, all known attempts at obstructing access to the Tor network, or identifying
a user of the Tor network rely on attacking the architectural components or passive observation of
traffic over the Tor network. As seen in Lewman (2009, 2012); Tor (2011a, 2011b); and Wilde (2012),
it is possible to identify the role(s) a particular node is performing in the Tor network. When a
connection is established, it is possible to determine which device is the client by identifying the TLS
“Client Hello” portion of the encryption exchange. Likewise, Wilde showed that Bridges are identified
in China and Kazakhstan through the TLS “Server Hello” messages within the encryption exchange.
So then, we know directly that there are certain identifiable characteristics attributable to each role
within the Tor architecture. This has been discussed further in Tor (2011a) as a code implementation
and auditing issue.
It may be possible to identify traffic flows through the Tor network without knowing the location of
Tor Relays, Bridges, or hosts. Tor specifies a cell size of 512 bytes. As such, it may be possible to
examine flows for multiple consecutive packets around this size, as it may indicate a Tor flow is
present. This pattern of packets will differ from that of a typical web transaction, where many
consecutive packets are sized at the MTU and only the last packet will be smaller than the MTU. This
is one example of the many different traffic and timing analysis attacks that could be utilized to
identify Tor traffic. Yet, this analysis doesn’t reveal the exact contents of the packets traversing the
Tor network. Specific patterns of Tor cells may reveal the obfuscated protocol(s) and thereby types of
traffic. However, no content is directly leaked out of the Tor network in any of the approaches.
Anonymity is compromised via correlation of these flows to potential traffic patterns of known flows,
or templates of flows.

5.2 Inculpatory Approaches
What, if any, evidence is available to prove participation with the Tor network? Many nations that are
actively pursuing censorship of their population typically wish to identify those that are evading the
systems in place that block or otherwise restrict access to the censored content. In identifying those
persons, there is the potential for legal action, if there is inculpatory evidence. We have shown that
many current nations that are blocking access to the Tor network are not yet actively pursuing the
participants for legal action. Yet, that is not to say that they will not do so in the future.
It has been suggested that a LEA wishing to identify inculpatory evidence should host its own exit
Relay within the Tor network and then actively perform traffic and timing analysis on the traffic as it
exits and any response traffic that is generated (Schneier, 2008). Additionally, they could perform
deep packet inspection on the traffic as it leaves the network, as the traffic will no longer be encrypted
using the Tor network’s layers of encryption. In this way, any unencrypted traffic would reveal the
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actual payload sent by the anonymous client. The difficulty with this approach is that a Tor client will
use a single channel for a single flow for no more than five minutes, by default. So, if the flow is
longstanding, hosting an exit node will only account for a portion of that flow.
As seen in the prior section, there are many proposed attack methods intended to circumvent
anonymity in Tor. As of this writing, there are no known successful attacks on the actual underlying
encryption standards used within Tor. However, it has been known for some time that the
vulnerabilities of encryption reside in potentially poor implementation of the encryption protocols and
standards, not the protocols themselves (Schneier, 1998). As such, this paper will not spend any
additional efforts to describe encryption circumvention attempts.
So then, based on the known executed attacks and potential attacks, what is the state of inculpatory
discovery attempts? There are many denial of service attacks, as seen by the Chinese, Kazakh, and
Iranian examples (Lewman, 2009; Lewman, 2012; Wilde, 2012). However, these do not provide any
inculpatory material for an investigator as the client’s identity has not been determined in any of these
cases. That is, only access to the Tor Directory Service has been limited (Winter and Lindskog, 2012).
Additional efforts are required to specifically identify the location and identity of the client in order to
gain inculpatory evidence, depending on jurisdiction.
Other investigative efforts have been performed and identified that a direct attack of the Tor protocol
and architecture is not the best means of identifying the users of the anonymizing service (Christensen,
2006a). Instead, attacks and manipulation of the application layer services being delivered over the
Tor network are a much better means of determining Tor users (Christensen, 2006b; Fleischer, 2009).
Additionally, a LEA may wish to establish a mechanism for additional inculpatory evidence to
elimination potentially indefensible scenarios. Exploiting the clients and services within this network
could allow a LEA to place a unique “key” on a host under investigation, assuming they control part
of the network, or a service requested by the client. Shebaro (2010) has proposed a mechanism by
which a unique and recoverable bit pattern can be placed onto a host over the period of ~30 minutes
with little possibility of timing analysis revealing its transmission.
Is Exculpatory evidence present or even feasible? As evidence may be present from other “regular”
web browsing and file handling, specifics about exculpatory evidence are not explicit in this study.
Understanding that there are differing thresholds for inculpatory evidence inclusion in any
examination is critical (Loesing, Murdoch, Dingledine, 2010). In fact, there are hints of mere
proposition of inculpatory evidence being sufficient to incarcerate or otherwise persecute individuals.
(Hale, 2012).

6. CONCLUSIONS
The Tor network was devise and deployed as a low-latency anonymity-providing overlay network for
TCP flows. It is implemented in a manner so that no node within the network can identify a complete
flow through the network. A node is only capable of communicating with directly adjacent Tor nodes,
even though they require potentially significant standard routing processes to connect those two
adjacent nodes. This anonymity-providing network is now in use by those simply wishing to obfuscate
their traffic from any potential observers as well as by those actively attempting to circumvent
censorship. Because of this, those entities advocating censorship actively wish to maintain the
censorship by eliminating the means used to evade it.
Traffic analysis of Tor nodes operating in a known infrastructure currently provides little inculpatory
evidence without significant efforts to capture traffic at ingress and egress of multiple points of the
network. Correlating this analysis to individual hosts on the Internet in a reliable and defensible
manner poses a daunting challenge. Yet, this is, to date, the only executable attack against the Tor
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network that attempt to determine “what” an individual flow might contain. The encryption methods
used within Tor have not been circumvented. So, the raw payload of the traffic is not viewable.
There are potential attack points with the Tor architecture and the protocols implemented. Some, of
which, have already been executed. However, these are not trivial exercises to perform or leverage
these attacks. The more likely approach to breach the Tor network is to attempt to expose the identity
of the users via exploitation of the weak (in terms of security) implementations of application-layer
protocols and services that directly interact with those protocols.
Inculpatory evidence from the Tor network is difficult to obtain for most nation-states and their law
enforcement agencies. Simple monitoring of existing Tor nodes will not directly reveal the types of
traffic contained in the flows that passed, nor will any Tor node know the complete path that the flow
is taking. Even if an agency were to implement a Tor Relay or Bridge and monitor connections to it,
significant man-power and technical expertise is required to maintain and monitor these nodes for the
purpose of ultimately reporting analyses on traffic behaviors. This is an implausible scenario for all
but the largest of LEAs… typically those that are state-sponsored.
By looking at each individual component of the Tor network, the significance and amount of effort
required to begin these attacks or analysis of the attacks can be seen. Beginning with inculpatory
Analysis at a Directory–Since no user application data is sent to, passed through, or retrieved from the
Directory there is little chance of inculpatory evidence. Also, since no single directory is authoritative
for the state of all Relays in the Tor network there is no single point of attack, meaning also that there
is no single point for investigation. As there is a voting process between all Tor Directories that
establishes an agreed upon state of each Relay and publishes to all requesting Hosts as a network
consensus document there could be the potential for learning some capability information of each
Relay. But, this process is handled over encrypted links between each Directory and the Directory and
Host. Additionally, there is no Directory discovery process for Hosts or Relays. Instead, the
Directories are coded within the Tor toolset currently. So, all communications with a directory are
encrypted. However, if this information is needed, it is not private information to the Tor network. A
simple query to a Directory will result in the current network consensus document. This may have
little inculpatory (or exculpatory) value unless it can be obtained during a specific monitoring period,
as the document is updated on an ongoing basis.
Inculpatory Analysis at Entry node (Relay) – As shown in many of the insecure application attacks,
the Onion Proxy (Host) can potentially be identified as the source of a flow of traffic. But, after the
secure onion router circuit is established, traffic & timing analysis are the only viable methods, which
is not significant in many cases, as attribution is significantly difficult.
Inculpatory Analysis at Intermediate relay – An intermediate (second) Relay in the onion routed path
cannot identify source or destination without significant effort. This would require capabilities to
monitor all relays in the onion route path in addition to performing traffic and timing analysis. This
only provides the capabilities to perform attribution of ingress flows to egress flows with an uncertain
level of probability. So then, only directly adjacent relays are known, and all communications along
that channel segment are encrypted multiple times.

7. FUTURE WORK
While the forensic analysis that was briefly surveyed here shows little current inculpatory evidence is
available by monitoring, and even participating in, the Tor network, there is significant interest in
further evading detection of the Tor network. Some have proposed a censorship-detection add-on to
the Tor network, while others are concentrating on continuing to push for the maturation of Tor.
Extending the idea that Tor is a privacy- and anonymity-enhancing tool, and that those that block and
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monitor Tor do so out of a desire to limit access to some resource, there are efforts required to define
anti-forensic mechanisms within the Tor network.
Lastly, the mixes of Relays that are provide to the Tor client to establish circuits and connections are
in need of more research. First, a thorough evaluation of the allocation policy and its potential to leak
location or other identity information could be performed. Next, it has been suggested that even
though multiple Relays are returned in a mix and are thought to be geographically diverse, they may
still be part of the same administrative domain (BGP ASNs). There has been some effort to alleviate
this, as no two Relays within the same /16 CIDR block will be selected in the same circuit. But, there
has been no definitive proof that this is sufficient. So, it should be determined if this is indeed the case
en masse, or as the outlier. To protect against such a situation, it is suggested that a module be added
to the Tor Directory that documents the correlation between destination IP addresses and the BGP
autonomous system in which those destinations reside. The ultimate purpose of this module will be to
ensure that a mix provided by the Directory does not contain Relays from the same, or adjacent, ASes.
Further, there are additional architectural implementations of Tor that provide hidden services, where
dual-party anonymity is possible. Additional efforts are needed to determine the state of forensics on
those particular architectures and the services available over Tor network in this hidden nature.
Identification of services offered and how they are processed through the Tor network with respect to
the “standard” delivery of those services is of some interest.
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